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Abstract 
 
Safe-by-Design (SBD) frameworks for the development of emerging technologies have become 
an ever more popular means by which scholars argue that transformative emerging technologies 
can safely incorporate human values. One such popular SBD methodology is called Value 
Sensitive Design (VSD). A central tenet of this design methodology is to investigate stakeholder 
values and design those values into technologies during early stage research and development 
(R&D). To accomplish this, the VSD framework mandates that designers consult the 
philosophical and ethical literature to best determine how to weigh moral trade-offs. However, 
the VSD framework also concedes the universalism of moral values, particularly the values of 
freedom, autonomy, equality trust and privacy justice. This paper argues that the VSD 
methodology, particularly applied to nano-bio-info-cogno (NBIC) technologies, has an 
insufficient grounding for the determination of moral values. As such, an exploration of the 
value-investigations of VSD are deconstructed to illustrate both its strengths and weaknesses. 
This paper also provides possible modalities for the strengthening of the VSD methodology, 
particularly through the application of moral imagination and how moral imagination exceed the 
boundaries of moral intuitions in the development of novel technologies.  
 
Keywords: value sensitive design, design psychology, moral imagination, applied ethics 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Developed for software engineering and systems development, Value Sensitive Design (VSD) 
was conceived by its founders Batya Friedman and others in the decade prior to the twentieth 
century (Friedman 1996). The methodology's intent begins with the premise that technology, and 
its design, is not value-neutral; building on the ethical and political ladenness of artifacts within 
the field of science and technology studies (STS) which argues along similar threads (Pinch and 
Bijker 1987). The social and moral abstracts of design, particularly within that of the human-
computer interaction (HCI) community, are what have been of particular interest to Friedman 
and colleagues. (Friedman, Kahn Jr., and Borinng 2008; Borning and Muller 2012).  
 
Similar communities interested in value-based technological development have, and still are, in 
development and use such as participatory design, universal design and inclusive design. These 
different research communities, although focusing on the incorporation of values, differ from the 
VSD framework given that the former methodologies tend to prize instrumental and functional 
values such as user-friendliness (van den Hoven and Manders-Huits 2009; Newell et al. 2011). 
VSD, on the other hand, aims to primarily investigate the stakeholder values of moral, rather 
than functional or pragmatic importance. These values most centrally include freedom, 
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autonomy, equality, trust, and privacy justice (Friedman 1997). Although the instrumental values 
that may be enrolled in the design and development of the technology can be translated as values 
important to VSD, this framework’s primary attention concerns moral values.  
 
Beyond moral epistemology, VSD methodology assumes that upon close analysis of values, 
some may be determined to be universal among different cultures and societies. Although these 
values may manifest themselves in varying ways, upon close analysis one can decide that in fact, 
those manifestations are merely a variation of a universal value. This is the contention that is 
asserted by Friedman (Friedman 1997). As such, the goal of this paper is to argue that the 
universal values that VSD instantiates are built on contentious foundations. I contend that, in 
light of recent developments in cognitive sciences, a revaluation of moral theory and 
epistemology is necessary if VSD is to remain effective across diverse societies and cultures. To 
this end, this dissertation provides a thoroughgoing analysis of what the philosopher Mark 
Johnson calls ‘moral imagination’ and how moral imagination theory can reinforce the ethical 
investigations in VSD (Johnson 1993). This paper’s core thesis can be formalized as follows:  
 
1. VSD draws from Moral Law Theories to inform responsible innovation (RI). 
2. Moral Law Theories fail to capture an accurate understanding of human cognition.  
3. An accurate mapping of human cognition is necessary for salient human design. 
4. :. VSD, as it currently exists, is insufficient for informing RI.  
5. Moral Imagination theory accurately maps on to human cognitive architectures.  
6. :. An adoption of moral imagination theory in VSD will make it more accurate in 
informing RI.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to explore the value-investigations that are 
central to the VSD framework in isolation. Prior literature on VSD has focused on judging the 
applicability of moral values to technological systems (Brey, 2010; J. Davis & Nathan, 2015), 
VSD methodology (van den Hoven and Weckert 2008), applications of VSD to current 
technological innovations (Briggs & Thomas, 2015) as well as to novel technologies 
(Timmermans et al., 2011; van Wynsberghe, 2013, 2016). Although all these studies provide 
useful information, they are built upon the existent assumptions regarding the validity of the 
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moral values enrolled in VSD's value-investigations. This paper's deconstruction of the enrolled 
moral values is comparatively unique; the intention being to spur continued discussions on some 
of the most pertinent ethical issues regarding the design of emerging and converging 
technologies. 
 
To successfully tackle these arguments, this article is organized into the following sections: the 
first presents an in-depth account of the VSD framework. The goal of doing so is to lay out the 
methodology envisioned by VSD’s founders as well as the framework’s evolution to its current 
state. Particular attention is given to what VSD calls ‘conceptual investigations', one of its 
tripartite constituents which investigates stakeholder values. As this is the part that explicitly 
focuses on, and is dedicated to, the exploration of moral values, it is of the most significance for 
this paper's analysis. The second section deconstructs conceptual investigations, mainly looking 
at the normative ethics on which it takes for granted. In doing so, I evaluate its normative 
foundations both independently and within the framework itself. The final section of this paper 
provides a thorough overview of moral imagination theory, why it crucial to conceptualize 
morality within this framework as well as how it can inform the VSD approach.  
 
2. Value Sensitive Design (VSD)  
VSD is a design methodology founded for technology design with the aim to incorporate human 
values1 into early design phases in an encompassing and formalized manner (Friedman, Kahn Jr., 
et al. 2013). Because VSD was birthed from the needs of informational and computational 
systems design, a design framework was necessary to encompass the value focuses of the field. 
Specific research emphasis within the field found that the values of privacy, ownership, property, 
physical welfare, freedom from bias, universal usability, autonomy, informed consent, and trust 
were each of substantial value to stakeholders to warrant a principled methodology for their 
incorporation into informational and computation systems (Friedman, Kahn Jr., et al. 2013). As 
such, the VSD framework was developed in the effort to provide a principled way for designers 
to account for these values in early design phases (Friedman, Hendry, and Borning 2017). VSD 
has since been adopted as the potential design methodology for the applications of technologies 
                                                      
1 The recent literature in technology studies have argued for the inseparability and against the bifurcation of the 
nature/culture dichotomy, and similarly against the privileging of human values over the values of nonhuman 
animals (see for example Harman, 2018; Morton, 2016). 
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outside of the ICT and HCI communities (e.g., Umbrello & De Bellis, 2018; van den Hoven, 
2013).  
 
According to VSD founders, although rich with different meaning and definitions, values take on 
something that is beyond the factual distinction of which they may sometimes be equated. Thus, 
the fact/value separation is of critical importance here. One cannot be conflated with the other, 
and as such a fact does not logically entail that it is of value. Thus, what is of ‘value’ in VSD are 
those “interests and desires of human beings within a cultural milieu” (Friedman et al., 2013, 
71), yet the reduction to universalism2 and absolutism is nonetheless affirmed by VSD theorists 
and practitioners (e.g., Friedman & Kahn Jr, 2003; van Wynsberghe, 2012). Section 2 provides a 
more in-depth discussion of what values are of ethical importance and implicated in technology 
design. The framework, then is situated within the broad range of VSD literature from its 
founding values of import to more contemporary value investigations.  
 
 
2.1 A Tripartite Framework 
 
The design of technologies and the artifacts and techniques that emerge from their highly 
collaborative network of assemblages enroll a host of processes that form an implosive whole, 
that is it is greater than the sum of its parts (for a more in-depth analysis of this see Harman, 
2016; Morton, 2018). VSD, in and of itself, is similar in this way too. VSD is iterative, it builds 
upon existing design practices and traditions as well as on itself as new information, techniques, 
issues, and advancements emerge throughout the design process. As such, VSD is composed of 
three distinct, yet necessarily interrelated parts or stages: conceptual investigations, empirical 
investigations and technical investigations. 
 
VSD’s method sets it apart from competing approaches because it is markedly self-reflexive, 
falsifiable, and recursively self-improving. Similarly, VSD is anticipatory and does not impute 
values or responsibility to individuals or groups solely on an ex post facto basis (van den Hoven 
2017). VSD is thus predictive, aiming to ascertain potentially implicating values before they 
                                                      
2 Universalism is not equivocal with absolutism. The former argues that moral values are independent of socio-
cultural differences, whereas the latter is concerned with intrinsically right/wrong actions.   
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materialize and in response “influences the design of technology early in and throughout the 
design process” (Friedman, Kahn Jr., and Borning 2006, 12). I outline only the first part of the 
methodology given that it is the one that is most philosophically based. The latter two, empirical 
and technical investigations, although feeding into the first, come after the stakeholders are 
delimited and values discerned.  
 
2.1.1 Conceptual Investigations 
 
This is considered the most theoretical among the tripartite investigations. Conceptual 
investigations are philosophically informed and require consultation with the philosophical 
literature. To this end, it aims to answer questions of limitations and constraints both prior to and 
throughout the design process such as: Who are the stakeholders? What are the situationally 
relevant values? Where are the boundaries when discussing often inversely relational values like 
convenience vs. safety? When do the limits of accepted practice come under question when 
conflicting with relevant values? What are the opportunity costs of one design over another? 
These questions and other theoretical areas are explored in conceptual investigations (see 
Denning, Kohno, and Levy 2013 who do this with smart homes). Research is thus undertaken 
that set the stage for the remaining two investigations, however, those proceeding investigations 
reflexively update the conceptual parameters that were initially considered.  
 
3. What Are Values?  
 
Because it is the goal of this dissertation to articulate a novel framework from which VSD can 
conceptualize values, it is vital to articulate first what values are and how they are designed into 
artifacts. To begin, when entering into discussions about values, the lack of agreement between 
scholars and the existent literature makes any absolutist conception of ‘value’ - whether ontic or 
epistemic - highly contentious. To this end, this paper does not aim to argue for any such 
certainty, instead, this section will opt to discuss how VSD per se conceptualizes values.  
 
In the VSD scholarship, a value is considered that attribute with which an individual or group 
consigns significance (see more specifically Friedman & Kahn Jr, 2003, 2). Throughout their 
discussion of values, Friedman & Kahn (2003) explore a genealogical account of values, and 
how, historically, they have been articulated. To this end, the authors’ eventually opt for a 
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deontic account of values that they believe can be distilled from a historical investigation of 
value conceptualization, particularly those that are of direct relevance to technological design 
and development (specifically Friedman & Kahn Jr., 2003, 6). The decision to formalize this set 
of values is due to their apparent trans-societal universality. However, the authors do recognize 
the incommensurability of these values, their dynamic character depending on what technology 
is under consideration and the socio-cultural context in which the design is being undertaken. 
Still, the underlying characteristic of these chosen values, despite their varying relevance, are 
taken as universal regardless of the socio-cultural hermeneutics that is employed to distill them.  
 
With this in mind, how are values – at least in the VSD sense – designed into artifacts? 
Technology philosopher Philip Brey provides a salient way of conceptualizing this integration: 
 
The idea of embedded values is best understood as a claim that technological artifacts 
(and in particular computer systems and software) have built-in tendencies to promote or 
demote the realization of particular values. Defined in this way, a built-in value is a 
special sort of built-in consequence…Then tendencies for the promotion of values are 
identified as special kinds of built-in consequences of technological artifacts (P. A. E. 
Brey, 2012, 3). 
 
Because of this, values are instantiated and expressed via their use. To this end, some values that 
may not have been manifest prima facie may express themselves when implemented by users. 
Dangers that may result are easy to envision, particularly when cognitive biases are implicated in 
technological design (Caviola et al. 2014). Although some work has been undertaken to limit the 
effects of cognitive biases in technological design, the danger that implicit or biased values may 
be embedded lingers nonetheless and calls for a more holistic conceptualization of values that is 
in line with developments in the cognitive sciences and their findings on the basic structure of 
human cognition and moral reasoning (an ad hoc functionalist means of de-biasing VSD has 
already been undertaken, see Umbrello, 2018b).  
 
For this reason, I argue that moral imagination provides an effective framework for 
conceptualizing the ‘design turn in applied ethics', and in particular VSD. The following section 
presents a thorough layout of what moral imagination theory is, why it is preferable over the 
Enlightenment tradition of moral theorizing as well as how VSD can be modified to better 
account for values in design.   
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4. Moral Imagination and Imagining Possible Futures 
 
From Plato onwards, the continued variance between the existent theories of morality is, in itself, 
an indicator of the often conflicting commitments, values and aims that individuals find 
themselves in their day-to-day lives. Ultimately, distilling any of this ‘moral overload’ (see van 
den Hoven et al., 2012) to a single, universal or absolutist principle for grading diverging 
commitments falls short; something is always sacrificed, albeit even if intuitively, when adopting 
any moral law tradition (e.g., Stocker 1976a).  
 
This process calls for, as Mark Johnson indicates, “moral imagination…in all its various 
manifestations, as a means to both knowledge and criticisms” (Johnson, 1993, 187). What this 
means is a reflexive understanding of the self and the imaginative structure of moral deliberation 
including its principles and constraints. This also applies to those who reside and ascribe to 
traditions of morality that differ from our own. Imagining available possibilities that can 
translate, inform and modify our behaviours and actions and how those imaginaries affect our 
moral deliberations is what is involved. Moral growth is thus attained via an imaginative 
rationality aimed towards the understanding of cultures, institutions, systems and the self 
(Johnson 1993).  
 
Moral Law Theories (MLTs) such as deontology, utilitarianism and their various offshoots 
rarely, if at all, result in moral growth. What they do is instead argue, mistakenly, that there are a 
constrained set of rules, with definitive actions for making moral decisions. This is typically 
undertaken in prototypical cases that are themselves constrained and unambiguous. Instead, how 
they should be viewed is as a distillation of a common set of past collective practices, situated 
within a particular moral habitat that applies to unproblematic cases. However, these MLTs 
become ineffable when confronted with the moral overload of day-to-day life and even more so 
with morally ambiguous technologies, of which no rooted rules or laws can clearly resolve (e.g., 
Caviola et al., 2014).  
 
Moving beyond resolute theories on how to behave, or that they should give us rules is difficult, 
and particularly contentious within the analytic tradition. To this end, to formulate a strong 
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argument for why MLTs, as they are envisioned within safe-by-design (SBD) approaches to 
technological development, this section outlines moral imagination theory. Naturally, given the 
length constraints of this paper, the account detailed here will be skeletal, and the lack of 
multiple examples, case studies, and narrative modalities should not be construed as an argument 
against the strength of moral imagination theory. Readers should make careful note of the full-
length arguments existent within the scholarship that adequately buttress moral imagination 
despite its current lack of popularity and dissemination (Johnson 2014; Fesmire 2003). 
 
 
4.1 Situating Moral Imagination 
 
The crux of moral imagination theory is founded on the consideration that moral reasoning is 
fundamentally imaginative and is constituted, given advances in the cognitive sciences, by 
shared essential imaginative elements. Here I will give a brief account of each of these proposed 
elements.  
 
4.1.1 Concepts as being Prototypical  
 
The classical understanding of basic concepts as being accountable through a 
sufficient/necessary framework does not take into consideration that even the most foundational 
notions of cognition have an architecture that is not exhaustible by this traditional account of 
concepts. For example, the concept of love is prototypical in the sense that there are undoubtedly 
categorical constituents that are paramount – both cognitively and experientially – but there are 
also peripheral constituents which, although not central to the concept itself, are more 
fundamental to critical examples.  
 
To this end, Johnson (1993) argues that MLTs must be abandoned if, in fact, our basic moral 
concepts (e.g., harm, love, justice, etc.) are prototypical in constitution. This is based on MLTs 
erroneous account of concepts and their resulted view of moral judgments founded on the 
concept-understanding landscape. The ways that MLTs seeks to apply absolute judgments3 to 
                                                      
3 Here ‘absolute’ refers to ‘moral absolutism’ in which there is an objective basis on which ethical beliefs can be 
evaluated.  
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samples by designating features via a sufficient/necessary approach is itself insufficient; many of 
these concepts are not ontic in the real world as MLTs characterize them.  
 
This does not mean that MLTs are not functional. Prototypical cases can, usually, be accounted 
by MLTs without much controversy within a given moral framework. However, the existence of 
these very moral principles is predicated on their ability to address the prototypical, fundamental 
constituents of moral concepts, rather than their peripheries. 
 
In contrast, quotidian moral issues surround, instead, the aprototypical situations that individuals 
find themselves in. However, it is precisely located here, on the edges of those prototypical 
concepts where the rules prescribed by MLTs fail to function. This is because MLTs cannot, in 
and of themselves, be extended to encompass these types of cases. Why? Because MLTs are 
themselves constituted by strict rule-judgments that do not include the capacity for imaginative 
amplification. Nonetheless, it is this very imaginative ability to address day-to-day moral 
concerns that is necessary, something MLTs are not equipped, and never were equipped, to 
provide.  
 
Still, we do possess the capacity for making informed moral judgments. Precepts that allow for 
application from central prototype cases to peripheral aprototypical cases exist. Metaphor is 
perhaps one of the most potent tools available to individuals for making this center-periphery 
leap. Our socio-cultural embodied experience is what permits us to attribute differentiated levels 
of significance to some instances rather than others. We learn about love, not as a formalized set 
of features/rules that constitute the central concept, but from prototypical experiences of dating, 
spatiotemporal closeness (and separation) as well as physical affection; however, they are not 
exhausted by these experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). 
 
Similarly, the experience of these prototypes is situationally contextual, and this situatedness 
comprises dynamic and incommensurable affect. This means that various emotional and 
cognitive states can emerge as a result of this situatedness, all of which are different catalysts for 
action. To this end, the essential moral concepts that we possess cannot be reduced to 
disembodied, purely rationalistic features, but are fundamentally co-constituted by our variated 
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emotional states of embodiment. This means that prototypical models are necessarily dynamic 
and account for various value-changes. Challenging, often multi-faceted situations that emerge in 
continually changing societies require greater encompassing power that move far beyond the 
more primordial prototype from which they began. The co-construction of the prototype-
aprototype amplification means that the features of central prototypes will similarly be modified 
across time.  
 
In sum, because of MLTs’ inability to account for non-abstracted contextuality, their potency is 
contingent on their applicability to the prototype itself, MLTs cannot remain potent 
independently. Similarly, moral growth requires the extension of prototypes to aprototypical 
cases via imagination amplification. This results in a cathartic dynamism of prototypes and is 
precisely what permits moral flourishing.   
 
4.1.2 Prejudgments  
 
Like contextualization described in the preceding subsection, the manner in which various cases 
are conceptually confronted is of critical import. Like metaphors and prototypes which are 
central to the way individuals approach and conceive circumstances. The way these confronted 
circumstances are approached and understood is fundamental to the actions taken (or not taken) 
in response. Consider an imagined case where a terminally-ill individual is given experimental 
nanorobotics to deliver targeted pharmaceuticals without consent and dies as a result. Conceived 
as an unethical application of power on behalf of medical professionals, we may respond in one 
way, however conceptualizing it as an empathetic, last-ditch attempt by doctors to save the 
already-dying patient’s life may result in a very different response.  
 
Language and semiotic structures often implicate imagination, mostly through the enrollment of 
prototypes and metaphors, among others. What these structures do then is not reflect some 
indisputable, external concept/case, but translate it. Because the prejudgments that we bring with 
us into situations where moral evaluation and action is undertaken changes the way we act, a 
reflexive self-analysis of what prejudgments we are in possession of is necessary if we wish to 
arrive at an authentic understanding that human moral judgment is contingent upon.  
 
 12 
4.1.3 Metaphor 
 
I have consistently brought the concept of metaphor into accounting for what moral imagination 
theory consists of, and because of its central importance to the theory it warrants further detail. 
 
The basic contention of moral imagination theory (MIT) is that moral deliberations hinge on the 
use of at least more than one metaphor and not the universal application of moral laws onto 
external cases (Johnson 2014). This is a profound shift away from traditional conceptions of 
moral epistemology and the sources of moral knowledge. Novel issues emerge out of this 
metaphorical extension and conceptualization of moral epistemology that could not have been 
devised by MLTs because metaphor has no place within those frameworks of morality at all.  
 
MLT, and post-Enlightenment Western philosophy, have typically conceived of metaphor as 
lacking any rational basis to be considered part of moral epistemology (i.e., the reason/desire 
bifurcation) (Wood 1999; Borges 2004).4 The cognitive/emotive dichotomy is typically asserted 
as a means to avoid the claim that metaphor is implicated in situational reasoning. Similarly, 
dissent regarding metaphor comes in another form, that being that they lack any objective 
determinacy to be sufficient for moral knowledge. As such, their content cannot map sufficiently 
onto cases nor give clear direction on correct action. The precarity that is often associated with 
extreme moral relativism is cited when conceptions of the metaphoric nature of human cognition, 
particularly in moral understanding is discussed.  
 
However, the fear of extreme relativism can be averted once there is a genuine understanding of 
metaphor as a universal process of comprehension, one that is curtailed by common biological, 
sociocultural, and institutional effects. What must be acknowledged, however, is that a plurality 
of possible actions can be taken in any situation, none of which are the deduced offspring of 
univocal universal laws. What MIT is then is a very restricted and limited form of moral 
relativism (Johnson 1993).  
 
                                                      
4 See also Critique of Pure Reason where Kant states along these lines that; “Inclination is blind and servile, whether 
it is kindly or not; and when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of mere guardian to inclination 
but, disregarding it altogether, must attend solely to its own interest as pure practical reason” (Kant, 2015, 5:118; see 
also KpV 5:71–72) 
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Here I think it would be useful to cite one of the specific examples that Johnson uses to explain 
the metaphoric nature of cognition. He identifies a set of particularly salient moral metaphors 
that are morally significant. One such metaphor is what he calls the moral accounting metaphor 
that aims to account for the increase/decrease of well-being. He divides this metaphor into five 
possible instantiations/interpretations of which he calls ‘schema'. Due to space limitations, I list 
one here solely as an illustration:  
 
Schema 1: RECIPROCATION: ‘one good turn deserves another’ 
EVENT: A gives something good5 to B. 
JUDGEMENT: B owes something good to A.  
EXPECTATION: B should give something good to A. 
MORAL INFERENCES: B has an obligation to give something good to A. A has a right 
to receive something good from. 
MONETARY INFERENCE: B pays A for getting something good by giving something 
good (of equal price).  
EXAMPLES: I owe you a favour for that good deed.   
  You saved my life! How could I ever repay you? 
  You’ve been so kind; I’m deeply indebted to you.  
  Your generous acts have earned you my respect.  
I owe you more than you’ll ever know, for what you’ve done for me.  
She bought his respect with her constant good will. (Johnson, 1993, 47.) 
 
What is happening here is a linguistic illustration of the structure of our moral reasoning, one of 
the innumerable examples within Western culture of how we speak and reason about morality 
(Taub 2012; Ervas, Gola, and Rossi 2018). The cognitive sciences have pushed beyond the 
inherited Enlightenment tradition of faculty psychology regarding the strict bifurcation of 
reason/desire resulting in a radical re-envisioning of the structure of human cognition. Examples 
of this are the concepts of genetically transmitted response strategies and the epigenetic rules of 
sociobiology (De Tiège et al. 2018; Segerstrale 2016). The once thought natural split between the 
two selves (in itself a profoundly theological construct) is reformulated as co-constituting one 
another, intermingled in constant evaluation and self-analysis that makes their a priori separation 
a fruitless, and philosophically erroneous endeavour (see Kahn, 1987; Tilmouth, 2007). 
 
                                                      
5 Here ‘something good’ is defined intra-metaphor as a “valuable commodity (or its monetary equivalent) …” 
(Johnson, 1993, 47).  
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In reevaluating the nature of moral knowledge, primarily by acknowledging its metaphorical 
structure, Johnson lists some of the implications for moral understanding that follow:  
• Because our moral understanding is metaphorical, understanding the nuances and 
specifics of that structure is essential to arriving at a more general understanding of self. 
In doing so, we can arrive at an understanding of our own prejudgments and similar 
values (Johnson 2013).  
• Perhaps the most important implication of metaphoric evaluation is that investigating 
metaphor allows us to determine potential contenders for univocal morals. Cross-culture 
experimental investigations can be undertaken to determine if specific metaphors, like the 
moral accounting metaphor, are essential to human practice. Methods have already been 
outlined for how this can be undertaken (Gibbs Jr 2017).  
• The universal understanding of the metaphoric structure of cognition allows us to 
ascertain, more specifically, where sociocultural influences come into play (such as the 
concept of transperspectivity outlined by Putnam, 1981, particularly at 168). Still, 
although similar metaphoric structures may be universally grounded, their instantiations 
and definition of values may nonetheless be markedly varied.  
• A general understanding of the metaphoric structure of cognition may show that the 
specific metaphors adopted by individuals, those who define their value structures, serve 
as the nail in the coffin for any ontological status of absolute moral values. What may 
constitute ‘absolute' in this sense, general or not, may be so divorced from its individual 
instantiation that its employment as a moral law would be absurd (Johnson 2014). 
However, the sociocultural instantiation of any particular metaphor may be so potent, 
despite being domain-specific, that it directs the actions within the group to a determinate 
degree (Goldberg 2016).  
• An emergent issue determines how well established is a metaphor, or network of 
metaphors (for more on embeddedness see Fauconnier and Turner, 2008a, 2008b). 
Naturally, the more central, or essential a metaphor is, the more distributed it will be as a 
node in a network of other metaphors. The essential nature of a metaphor is of concern, 
especially when discourses of change and critique come into play. The more established a 
metaphor is in cognition, the lower is its ability to shift. This does not entail the 
impossibility of change, but such change often comes with devastating sociocultural 
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expenditures; i.e., European/North American colonialism is a good example of change 
viz. coercion.  
• Aprototypical cases continually present themselves within the dynamic experience of 
being. Prototypical concepts must then be expanded to confront these. Metaphor is one of 
the cognitive structures that is employed in making this extension. Many of the moral 
issues that we confront when exposed to an original case is not the case per se but the 
difficulty in mapping prototypes on to aprototypical entities. Technology, in particular, 
presents continually dynamic and novel cases that stretch our moral prototypes in ways 
that enlightenment structures of moral deliberations simply did not, and which could not 
be accounted for essentially (Ervas, Gola, and Rossi 2018). 
• Moral growth is gained by metaphorical extrapolation from similar, yet different, past 
experiences to new ones. Metaphorical accommodation/assimilation can only be possible 
because of the plasticity of metaphors. 
• One of the critical points about the ontological nature of metaphors is that we can only 
have limited epistemic access to them. Because they are entities/objects that are 
consistently networked, interconnected, and enmeshed with other metaphors and 
cognitive structures, total understanding is impossible and any attempt to exhaust a 
metaphor through literal or relational strategies fails to capture it sufficiently (for a 
further exploration of the 'withdrawn' nature of objects/entities see Harman 2018a). One 
of the primary failures of the analytic moral tradition is its ultimately failed attempt to 
exhaust moral identity into a rule-based system that sidelines the very foundations that 
give this identity value.  
 
In sum, moral epistemology hinges on an intimate comprehension of how metaphors structure 
and are continually structured by human moral thought and action. In doing so, the varied – 
although potentially universally based – instantiations of moral metaphors force us to accept that 
cases of moral overload have a plurality of potential ways of being addressed, rather than a 
single, universal rule. This does not mean that radical subjectivism/relativism are affirmed, as a 
consequence (that would be a false dilemma). Biopsychosocial restrictions strongly delimit the 
contentiousness of subjectivism by limiting the foundations of specific metaphors within cultural 
bounds (e.g., like the psychobiological response patterns, see Kemeny, 2009). The latter is 
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avoided because of the cognitive sciences which have shown the universality of some metaphors 
as being the consequence of embodied being (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2017; Gibbs Jr 
2006).  
 
4.1.4 Narrative 
 
The function of the narrative structure of moral understanding and growth is often overlooked 
within the analytic tradition of moral theorizing. It has been noted that individuals seeking moral 
growth turn towards narratives (in the physical or performed modes) over the formulaic moral 
texts of philosophers (Rorty 1989; Peterson 1999; Mordini 2007).  
 
The ultimate motivations for why narratives have such moral importance, and thus impact on 
moral growth lie in the narrative structure of day-to-day human-being. Our embodied, lived 
experiences within a structured narrative permit agents to make discrete discernments between 
what is of moral import or not in any given situation (Krakowiak and Tsay-Vogel 2015; Kramp 
2003). What we do when we engage with performed narrative (books, plays, etc.) is that we 
engage in a vicarious projection of ourselves and embody the character’s thoughts, actions and 
moral anxiety (i.e., Sarbin 2001). In doing so, we engage in a reflexive dialogue and critique of 
their chosen paths and their actions which, as a function of our very engagement in this behavior, 
impacts and develops our own moral understanding (Haidt and Joseph 2007).  
 
Although the empirical literature on the narrative structure of moral growth (and similar 
cognitive modules) has been the product of the cognitive sciences, there has been philosophical 
work grounding the value of a narrative understanding of morality in philosophy as well. The 
vanguard of this tact has been by Nussbaum in her critical exploration of classical Greek tragedy, 
Fragility and Goodness, where she perceptibly states:  
 
a whole tragic drama, unlike a schematic philosophical example making use of a similar 
story, is capable of tracing the history of a complex pattern of deliberation, showing its 
roots in a way of life and looking forward to its consequences in that life. As it does all of 
this, it lays open to view the complexity, the indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of actual 
human deliberation…A tragedy does not display the dilemmas of its characters as pre-
articulated; it shows them searching for the morally salient; and it forces us, as 
interpreters, to be similarly active (Nussbaum, 2001, 14, emphasis mine). 
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Narrative, like life then, is not so determinate as the arguments moral philosophers are so apt to 
construe. Like Kant’s impenetrable das Ding-an-sich, no amount of re-contextualizing and 
forceful determinacy can exhaust the nuances and contextual contingencies of any given 
situation that an individual can, and will, inevitably find themselves. What narrative does then, at 
the very least, is bring a genuine colour to the portrait of which the rules of moral philosophers 
have only captured a tiny, but still important outline. 
 
Narrative, to this end, allows for a more holistic and situated evaluation of our diverse moral 
landscapes in time. Our various, and sometimes conflicting moral enmeshments can be engaged 
within a continually developing, rather than ad hoc, way (van den Hoven, Lokhorst, and van de 
Poel 2012). Narratives are a mode towards enrichment that cannot be captured in any meaningful 
sense, nor exhausted by moral laws (for more on exhuastion see Harman, 2016, 2018b).  
 
Even when we consider moral laws in themselves, their force – if that force becomes manifest – 
only emerge through a collective and experiential understanding of how these laws are embodied 
and function over time. Their salience is given force through narrative, not viz. some 
independent objectivity (D. J. Haraway 2016).  
 
In sum, the narrative structure of human experience and cognition must be given its due role in 
moral philosophy. This becomes particularly apparent as the continued development of 
transformative6 technologies shifts sociocultural, political and economic norms. Any sufficiently 
potent anticipatory design approach adopted for the development of these technologies must 
embody an imaginative architecture that more authentically maps our moral cognitive structures 
to our situated realities.  
 
4.2 Understanding the Moral Imagination 
 
Too move towards the application of moral imagination into the practical domain of VSD, here I 
will briefly summarize this section’s arguments regarding MIT. 
 
                                                      
6 Transformative being the operative term here, it’s particularly within a narrative and linguistic evaluation where 
substantial change occurs. 
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Firstly, the central thesis underlying MIT is that rather than the overly literal and law-like 
conceptions of morality that are envisioned by MLTs, MIT instead argues that understanding is 
what underpins morality, and any sufficiently apt moral theory must be itself understood as an 
experiential and progressive venture. Similarly, this understanding must reflexively be 
recognised as being imaginatively constituted by structures that are narrative, prototypical, 
semantically constrained by prejudgments and metaphorical (Johnson 2014). Moral growth is 
attained gradually through the realization of these imaginative structures, their limits and 
constraints, the possible open futures of discrete potentials and the consequences that these 
varied implications can have. 
 
This re-envisioning of morality as an act of understanding requires the disposal of any 
conception of objective moral absolutes as well as extreme relativism and subjectivism. The 
conception of the bifurcation and faculty psychology of the reason/desire dichotomy must be 
similarly discarded as illusory and the product of Enlightenment heritage thinking sans modern 
advances in the cognitive sciences which show otherwise (Gaesser, Keeler, and Young 2018; M. 
H. Davis 2018).  
 
Another condition follows this re-envisioning: the conception of moral understanding shifts the 
telos of moral inquiry away from the application of strict moral principles to cases and instead 
towards the goal of cultivating our abilities to discriminate the relevant moral dimensions of 
scenes and their actors as well as maturing our abilities to empathically extend our imagination 
toward envisioning ourselves in the experience of others (Koehn 2012; Oxley 2011). This is one 
of the fundamental constituents of the human moral makeup that has generally been sidelined in 
MLTs and is required for reflexive moral evaluation to take place (Stocker 1976b; Llewellyn et 
al. 2016).  
 
Finally, to better avoid confusion and to address possible rebuttals to the MIT, I briefly address 
the assumptions that may be levied against imagination as a concept itself. The analytic core at 
the centre of MLTs typically regard the distilled laws as the product of human rationality and to 
this end, consider imagination as antithetical to this conception. Imagination is thus relegated to 
an aesthetic realm within the Enlightenment understanding of cognition (i.e., faculty psychology) 
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(Johnson 2014). To this end, the aesthetic is considered independent and displaced from 
rationality and the reason-derived principles of moral theorizing. This tradition is based on the 
concept of determinacy towards application in specific instances, of which reason is understood 
as being the acme of determinacy whereas imagination is indeterminate (Rundell 2016; Kant 
2015). This is a false assumption.  
 
The rigid conceptions that were thought to demarcate reason from imagination and allow one 
faculty (reason) to distill rules of morality are based on unfounded assumptions of how human 
cognitive architecture is structured. The continued assumption of this reason/imagination 
bifurcation is the only conceptual route one can assume to exclude imagination from moral 
philosophy, however, the cognitive sciences have shown this dualism to be unfounded (Narvaez 
2016). Nevertheless, imagination, given its essentiality to human cognitive architecture, morality 
only being a single – yet interconnected – facet of this network consists of the distribution of the 
aesthetic in experience. Thus, explanatory modes that are linguistically characterized as 
‘scientific' or as ‘moral' can be construed as diverse instantiations of the aesthetic that differ in 
their priority of specific features or qualities. John Dewy best accounts this expanded 
conceptualization of the aesthetic structure of experience (Dewey, 1934, particularly at 46,55).  
 
Similarly, the MIT abates any criticism of extreme subjectivism and moral relativism by 
discussing morality within its necessarily embodied state, something that is collectively shared 
by the species; rather than the disembodied and ‘gods-eye-view’ perspective (D. Haraway 1988). 
Studies have shown the shared, yet diverse instantiations of universal archetypes across cultural 
divides (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2017; Goldsmith and Huck 2013). This enables a 
discourse between what are often divergent and conflicting moral traditions (MacIntyre, 1988 
especially at 144 best accounts the dialectic of moral growth between moral traditions).  
 
This section has given a cursory account of what MIT consists of and how MLTs that have 
dominated the western tradition of morality are, in themselves, insufficient for moral progress; 
particularly in aprototypical cases that individuals are confronted with in their quotidian lives. 
Because these day-to-day moral decisions are influenced in strange and often counter-intuitive 
ways by new and emerging technologies, the salience of design hinges on accounting for values 
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in a way that aligns with the actual structure of our moral cognition. To this end, the following 
section will assemble the VSD methodology by reformulating its conceptual investigations to be 
imaginatively structured rather than ‘principled’ as its founders envisioned (Friedman, Kahn, et 
al. 2013).  
 
5. Assembling a Dynamic Value-Sensitive Design 
 
This project thus far has demonstrated two things: 1) it has given an outline of the motivations 
for VSD’s (and other SBD approaches) emergence as well as a brief account of its structure and 
methodology; and 2) I have given a cursory argument of and for why MIT theory maps on to 
human reality in ways that MLTs are simply not equipped to do. The primary motivation behind 
this is that VSD and similar methodologies aim to address the value-ladenness of technology 
design through value investigations that essentially draw from the existent philosophical 
literature. The dominant analytic modes of moral inquiry have been the traditional sources of 
philosophical interest, but the ‘ecological turn’ in science and technology studies (STS) has 
resulted in a greater tapping of the continental tradition, mostly at the intersection of cultural 
anthropology (Morton 2018; Latour 2017).  
 
Still, much of the VSD literature has, and is currently, drawing from the inherited Enlightenment 
tradition based on faculty psychology, primarily the deeply anthropocentric post-Kantian 
tradition of correlationism7. As I have argued, this is untenable, mostly because the moral laws 
distilled from these traditions are not reflective of the constitution of human cognition, primarily 
its failure to account for the imaginative structures such as metonymy, metaphor and narrative 
that have been shown as essential to moral deliberation and development. The issues are 
exacerbated with the introduction and co-construction of transformative technologies, primarily 
NBIC artifacts that push the limits of our moral intuitions (Umbrello, 2018b) and stretch any 
embedded deontic ethics to inoperability beyond any strictly delimited and prototypical cases.  
 
                                                      
7 Correlationism was first coined by Quentin Meillassoux (2008) to describe the post-Kantian anthropocentric 
conceit that “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux, 2009, 5). This idea has been a common ground for criticism that has 
united the speculative realist philosophers.  
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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) prove to be a timely example, and a predictive precursor to more 
advanced autonomous technologies, particularly in the socio-ethical issues that emerge with their 
introduction (Etzioni and Etzioni 2016). Primary concerns with the ubiquitous rollout of AVs are 
when they are confronted with trolley-like ‘dilemmas’ of life and death as well as what designers 
and programmers can do to address these issues (Gogoll and Müller 2017). Primary recourse has 
been to ad-hoc implementations of hardware that can transfer the action-potential and 
consequential responsibility onto the driver (Contissa, Lagioia, and Sartor 2017). A similar 
strategy has been taken to offset the inevitable inclusion of cognitive biases when enrolling 
stakeholders to extract values for design, mostly by applying de-biasing heuristic tools 
(Umbrello 2018b). Still, these approaches to design are severely restricted, mostly because it 
requires the programming of prototypical cases and strict responses. The embedding of MLT 
approaches to decision-making inherently leaves some degree of moral overload, meaning that 
the option that the programmers embed do not exhaust the moral tension that the proposed 
‘dilemma’ appear to evoke. This is not to say that the MLT approach does not have some 
functional value, the reality remains that these technologies are being designed, rolled out, and 
integrated within the sociocultural milieu in which they are introduced. Ethical issues arise and 
must be addressed, this is an excellent preliminary avenue that can be taken, but further 
conceptual, technical, and empirical research must be undertaken for future technology 
assessment. 
 
5.1 Shifting Focus Towards Designers 
 
One of the most substantial progressions in applied technology ethics is one that emerged as the 
backbone of the design turn, primarily the shift of focus away from the artifacts themselves and 
towards the activities and values of stakeholders (both direct stakeholder such as designers and 
indirect stakeholders such as publics). Still, substantial emphasis in technology assessment and 
speculative techno-ethics discourses is placed on the moral agency of technologies per se. This is 
seen more often than naught in the literature on artificial intelligence, primarily artificial general 
intelligence (AGI) and artificial superintelligence (ASI). Although there is considerable value in 
speculative ethics (see especially Roache, 2008), care must be taken not to commensurate current 
forms of AI and those of a futuristic, although arguably inevitable forms of AI (Müller and 
Bostrom 2016). The operative point here is that the scholarship has argued that the latter 
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(AGI/ASI) constitute moral agents and similarly initiates discussions on personhood and rights 
attribution; the former, however, do not (Rolf and Crook 2016; Hughes 2014).  
 
To this end, designers and ethicists have, and still are, considering which ‘human values’ to 
incorporate in design, how we align technologies – AI for example  – towards pathways that are 
beneficial for human civilization (Umbrello and Baum 2018; Baum 2016). Aside from the 
blatant anthropocentrism and dominant Western moral ideology that are usually uncritically 
assumed in these discussions8, particularly when totalizing conceptions of ‘the world’ and 
‘human civilization’ are invoked, the modern deontic theories of morality (utilitarianism and 
deontology) are usually assumed as the philosophical solution, shifting the issues and attention 
towards technical means to operationalize them.  
 
What is needed then is a fundamental re-evaluation of the strategies adopted by designers and 
ethicists in technology assessment and SBD approaches that shift away from the static moral 
conceptions that are presently being considered and employed and instead towards an 
imaginative technology assessment and design methodology that begins with conceptual 
investigations built on the premises of an imaginative constitution.  
 
The following section offers a preliminary example of how this reassembly of VSD, in 
particular, can be undertaken. Naturally, the limits of a single paper of this type restrict this 
praxis to only a cursory and speculative level. However, it should be the work of future research 
projects to explore how, if at all, the imaginative structure of the human mind, with its use of 
metonymy, metaphor, and narrative can be implemented in design strategies without subverting 
itself to strict principles.  
 
5.2 A Praxis for Imaginative Value Sensitive Design (IVSD) 
 
Because the emphasis of this paper is on the moral approach that VSD adopts, it leaves out a full 
discussion of VSD's restructuring in favour of emphasizing conceptual investigations alone. 
 
                                                      
8 I have elsewhere criticised this Western moral dominance towards a preliminary course of adopting an approach of 
intersubjectivity (Umbrello 2018b). 
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At its core, VSD’s conceptual investigations ideally begin with researchers exploring and 
determining various ‘value scenarios’ that can be envisioned and the potential tensions and 
insufficiencies that may arise (Friedman, Hendry, and Borning 2017). This is done by 1) 
determining the stakeholder population group and 2) beginning with a core value (e.g., safety, 
autonomy, privacy, etc.). This also involves determining the project values (sources of funding, 
industry interests, etc.) (Borning and Muller 2012).  
 
An excellent way to begin rethinking the potential and nature of VSD is to: 
1. Abandon the notion of a core set of root values. Instead of thinking of values as 
culturally instantiated, and objectively distilled, instead think of basic cognitive 
modules as universally shared. 
2. Similarly, the varied conception of ‘value’ as such must be explored as 
socioculturally situated, metaphorically conceptualized, narratively embodied, and 
developed through metonymy. VSD then must humble itself away from embedding 
objective values in design and towards a conception of design as embodying a 
dynamic value development. This is directly in line with VSD’s explicit goals of 
flexibility and reflexivity.  
 
A means of approaching a salient IVSD could then be understood as injecting an imaginative 
tool-analysis alongside the basic VSD approach. Here I lay out the basic steps of conceptual 
investigations paired with a possible imaginative tool (iTool) that can be used to begin to rethink 
how VSD is practiced:  
 
Step 1: Determine project and designer values  
iTool: Identify prototypical structures implicated in the design project 
 
Step 2: Identify Direct and Indirect Stakeholders 
iTool: Identify the plurality of moral traditions that these populations may be part of. 
 
Step 3: Determine Benefits and Harms for Stakeholders 
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iTool: Determine a definition of benefits/harms a posteriori, that, at least functionally, is 
acceptable to all the enrolled stakeholder communities.  
 
Step 4: Identify Potential Values 
iTool: Identify prototypical structures 
 
Step 5: Distill Working Definition of Identified Values 
iTool: Expand how sociocultural aprototypical values are instantiated from prototypes. 
 
Step 6: Identify Value Conflict 
iTool: Identify if the conflicts emerge from opposing values within a single moral 
tradition or because of cross-tradition incomparability?  
 
Step 7: Use Heuristic Tools in Stakeholder Value-Elicitation 
iTool: Identify if heuristic tools are trans-socially applicable. Ask if they aim at prototype 
structures or aprototypical expansions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
What this paper has attempted to do is to provide an argument for why current design-for-values 
methodologies, particularly VSD are insufficient for informing responsible innovation. The 
primary motivation for this is they rely exclusively on the MLTs of the Anglo-American 
tradition of philosophy to design technologies across cultures. The crux of the argument 
proposed has been to show how these MLTs do not accurately map on to innate human cognitive 
architecture that employs metaphor, narrative, metonymy, and imagination when engaging in 
moral deliberation. To this end, this paper has offered a way to incorporate an imaginative 
rationality in the VSD framework that may authentically map on to human cognition. Future 
research projects should empirically investigate which prototypical structures exists across socio-
cultural divides and how those structures can be incorporated to form the core of VSD’s 
conceptual investigations. In lieu of these empirical finding, the proposition of this paper remains 
conceptual and extrapolative. Yet, the observations from the cognitive sciences makes a strong 
case for re-envisioning moral deliberations as an imaginative process nonetheless.  
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